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Abstract 
One of the unique banking in Indonesia is that there are regional 
development banks (BPD), which is a government-owned bank districts. 
regional development banks categorized as focused bank, ie the bank with 
regional focus. The objectives of this research is determinants of capital 
structure in region development bank (Bank Pembangunan Daerah). This 
research is to test the impact of different explanatory variables of capital 
structure internal and external factors. The external variables of the economy 
of a country in Indonesia are regional autonomy, economic crisis and bank 
policy of government.  The internal factor or characteristics of an individual 
bank are profitability, loans and size. The population consists of 26 
community development banks. The study 14 regional development banks 
because of difficulty in getting the data. The period under study is from 1995 
to 2010. The results showed the variable regional autonomy negative impact 
on leverage because obtain additional funds from the local government. 
Dummy equity positive impact on leverage the show that equity have more 
than 100 billion would increase the amount of debt and the crisis negative 
impact on leverage because BPD reduces the amount of debt for avoiding 
from bankruptcy. Internal variables showed loans negative impact on 
leverage, assets positive impact on leverage, while profitability has not impact 
different from previous studies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the unique banking in Indonesia is that there are regional development banks 
(BPD), which is a government-owned bank districts. BPD categorized as focused 
bank, ie the bank with regional focus. At present, the BPD has a core capital of 100 
billion rupiah to 10 trillion rupiah. Even all BPD was able to have a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio above 10%, so it belongs to the bank performs well. BPD thus able to 
create a healthy banking structure in the country and able to meet the needs of the 
community and to promote the ongoing economic development of Indonesia. 
 
The advantages BPD is a market that is very dominant and profitable local 
government. One of the reasons there are to be BPD bank cash account to the district 
collector. Even local government can make rules that put BPD as the only bank that 
can handle the affairs of the banking community. With the market, then the excellent 
products BPD is working capital products and services to the business. In addition, 
the BPD also deal with the other markets in the same district as dealing with the 
cooperation of local government, particularly in terms of suppliers and contractors. In 
terms of the consumer market, BPD clients consist of local government staff and 
other institutions in the region.. In addition, a proportion of the capital BPD comes 
from each local government that is stored either in the form of a deposit or deposited 
placement or shape demand. Operations and responsibilities survival BPD are at their 
respective local governments. 
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Given the importance of capital banks need to determine the optimal capital structure 
in order to survive well, which determining an optimal capital structure is very hot 
issue in the literature of finance (Amjad et al., 2012). Among the issue in the district 
is the first multilateral development banks, regional autonomy laws that govern the 
financial district balance will lead to a rise in the influence of local government funds 
placed in BPD. Second, this study also supports the Indonesian Financial Sector 
Masterplan (Indonesian bank architecture), where in 2011, all Indonesian bank 
ownership must have a minimum capital of 100 billion rupiah. Bank Indonesia 
introduced regulations to allow banks face crucial moments such as the current 
financial crisis. Third, Indonesia's financial and political crisis that occurred in mid-
1997 until 1999. These crises resulted in decreased performance of most banks. 
Banks are also experiencing problems with financial difficulties and bankruptcy 
threats. 
 
In previous literature, a lot of work is done on determining the factors which influence 
the capital structure of non-financial sectors. A number of factors were studied in this 
regard which would have impact on the capital structure of any organization. These 
factors may include profitability, size, assets’ tangibility, growth opportunities, debt tax 
shield, earning volatility, liquidity, age and non-debt tax shield. But a little work is done 
on determining the capital structure of financial sectors, especially for banking sectors in 
Indonesia. The main purpose of this study is to fill this gap by determining which factors 
have significant impact on capital structure decision of banking sector of Indonesia 
especially regional development banks during the period of 1995 to 2010. Moreover this 
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study is aimed at determining the influence of these determinants without the application 
of capital regulatory requirements. 
 
The objectives of this research is determinants of capital structure in region 
development bank (Bank Pembangunan Daerah) context are examined with reference 
to capital structure theories. Although the determination of factors that affect the 
capital structure will typically be an interesting debate (Titman & Wessels, 1988; 
Haris & Raviv, 1991). This research is to test the effect of different explanatory 
variables of capital structure internal and external factors. The external variables of 
the economy of a country in Indonesia are regional autonomy, economic crisis and 
bank policy of government (Regional autonomy and Indonesia bank architecture) are 
factors that affect the capital structure. The internal factor or characteristics of an 
individual bank are profitability, loans and size, which are termed here as internal 
factors also affect the capital structure of enterprises..  
 
.. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Based on MM theory was developed three theories. There are the trade-off theory 
(Bradley et al., 1984). Second pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984) and 
third, agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The pecking-order theory (Myers, 
1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests that capital structure choice is driven by 
the magnitude of information asymmetry present between the firm insiders and the 
outside investors. The more severe the information asymmetry, the more risk the 
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outside investors are facing and hence the more discount they demand on the price of 
issued securities. Consequently, firms will prefer financing through internal funds and 
if they do need to raise outside capital, they will firstly issue risk-free debt then 
followed by low-risk debt. Equity is only issued as a last resort. 
 
As stated in Myers (1984), the static trade-off theory assumes that firms set an 
optimal debt ratio and they move gradually towards it. The theory proposes that the 
optimal debt ratio is set by balancing the tradeoff between the benefit and cost of 
debt. The benefit of debt arises from the tax deductibility of interest payments on debt 
and the cost of debt comes in the form of higher probability of bankruptcy and the 
loss suffered. 
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), predicts capital structure choice based 
on the existence of agency costs, i.e. costs due to conflicts of interest. According to 
there are essentially two sources of conflicts. Conflicts between shareholders and 
managers arise since managers have an incentive to consume on perquisites while 
putting less effort on maximising profit for the firm. This is because managers bear 
the entire costs of pursuing profit maximisation while they do not receive the entire 
gain. By increasing the level of debt, this agency cost of managerial discretion can be 
mitigated.in the event of bankruptcy. 
 
This section debates the factors that determine a firm’s capital structure. The 
underlying theories and previous empirical evidence are also reviewed. First, The  
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external variables are regional autonomy, economic crisis and bank policy of 
government are factors that affect the capital structure. Second we present the 
internal factors firm-level variables are profitability, loans and size.  
 
2.1. External variables 
2.1.1 Regional autonomy 
 
Regional autonomy by Act No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government and Law No. 25 
of 1999 on Financial Balance between Central and Local Government has provided   
greater   opportunities for areas to optimize the management of the potential in the 
region. Regional development bank as the holder of the financial district, which has 
been set in the No.l3 Act of 1962 concerning the principles Conditions Regional 
Development Bank, working as regional economic development and mobilize local 
economic development to improve and provide financing development in the region, 
to raise funds and to implement and save the cash area in addition to running the 
activities of the banking business. With the capital of deposits in particular the 
government, which placed a burden on the regional development bank as well as 
revenue. A burden because the bank is obliged to pay the interest placed in current 
accounts Local Government. Third party funds into income for regional development 
bank, when placed in the form of interbank assets or credit to the debtor. If the 
difference between the expenses and the income generated is greater than the income, 
the benefits to be derived, and vice versa. Therefore, this study will look at the effect 
of Regional autonomy on bank capital structure.  
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2.1.2 Equity 
 
Financial economists have recently placed more emphasis on the role of a legal 
system in the domain of financial decisions (Demirgüc¸ -Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1996, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Recently, a variety of papers have examined 
the adoption of different legal systems and their impact on corporate finance. La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that the legal environment plays a decisive role in the 
development of capital markets, because it impacts accounting standards, 
shareholders’ rights, and creditors’ rights. They indicate that Common law countries 
benefit from having both good accounting standards and strong investor protection. 
 
In Indonesia had the Banking Master Plan Indonesia (Indonesia bank architecture, 
API), where in the year 2011, all acquisitions of banks in Indonesia must have a 
minimum equity of 100 billion rupiah. Bank Indonesia introduced rules to allow 
banks face crucial moments like the current financial crisis. Therefore, this study will 
look at the effect of minimum capital requirements on bank capital structure. This 
study will test the appropriateness of this decision. If smaller banks are less likely to 
withstand severe economic downturn, then the coefficient of equity, which will be 
proxy by Dummy equity should be impact on leverage. However, it could also be 
argued that smaller banks will be more responsible in their lending activities since 
they know that imprudent lending decision would more likely to lead to bankruptcy 
as compared to larger banks. banks can increase the amount of bank equity can 
increase the amount of debt. 
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2.1.3  Banking Crisis 
 
Indonesian banking crisis began when the "net open position" increases, the value of 
capital ratio becomes negative and bad debt ratio to 50%. It is then followed by a 
negative bank earnings as a result of the sharp rise in interest rates since the middle of 
the second half of 1997. The financial crisis has led to the banking system has 
experienced financial difficulties and banking structure changed very significantly. 
This is due to the various weaknesses in banking and is exacerbated by the financial 
crisis, liquidity crisis and bankrupt crises experienced by the conglomerate in 
Indonesia. This resulted in many banks experiencing financial difficulties and the 
banking sector is a threat of bankruptcy. Therefore, this study will look at the effect 
of economic crisis on bank capital structure. Hasil penelitian Fosberg (2012) 
menunjukkan bahwa terdapat pengaruh neagatif masa krisis terhadap Leverage. The 
results Fosberg (2012) showed that there are significant negative crisis on Leverage. 
 
 
2.2 Internal Variables 
 
2.2.1 Profitability 
The trade-off hypothesis pleads for the low level of debt capital of risky firms (Myers 
1984). The higher profitability of firms implies higher debt capacity and less risky to 
the debt holders. So, as per this theory, capital structure and profitability are 
positively associated. But pecking order theory suggests that this relation is negative. 
Since, as stated earlier, firm prefers internal financing and follows the sticky dividend 
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policy. If the internal funds are not enough to finance financial requirements of the 
firm, it prefers debt financing to equity financing (Myers 1984). Thus, the higher 
profitability of the enterprise implies the internal financing of investment and less 
reliance on debt financing. Most of the empirical studies support the pecking order 
theory. The studies of Titman and Wessels (1988), Friend and Lang (1988),  Fama 
and French (1998), Hammes (1998), Gleason at al. (2000), Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
Deesomsel et al. (2004), Cheng and Shiu (2007), Shah and Khan (2007), Gill et al. 
(2009), Céspedes et al. (2010) Gropp and Heider (2010), Khrawish and Khraiwesh 
(2010), Ellili and Farouk (2011), Afza and Hussain (2011), Alves and Ferreira 
(2011),  Siringoringo (2012), Sanistyaningrum and Gandakusuma (2012), Amjad et 
al. (2012) and Sharif et al. (2012) show the negative relation between profitability and 
the level of debt in capital structure. While, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Aggarwal 
(1994) and Burgman (1996) are finding a positive profitability on leverage. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Loans 
 
Loans are part of the current assets, current assets of the banking sector is more 
important than fived bank assets because they can manage the funds rapidly. By the 
bank because they prefer to have current assets greater than total assets. Many 
researchers used liquidity as an independent variable to measure its impact on 
leverage of the firm. Basically liquidity is the ability of any firm to meet its short 
term obligation when they become due. Ozkan (2001) reported that higher liquidity 
ratio implies that a firm has more power to pay its debt as they become due, hence, 
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the firm can structure its financing pattern by taking more debt rather than issuing 
equity. This research shows that liquidity has direct relationship with leverage ratio. 
Yu (2000) also observed that banks with more liquidity have positive impact on 
leverage. On the other hand, Tong and Green (2005) observed an inverse relationship 
of liquidity with leverage. Childs et al. (2005) concluded that firms avoid interest rate 
and liquidity risk and have negative relation of long term debt ratio with liquidity. 
Similarly Guney et al. (2011), Mishra and Tannous (2010), Amjad et al. (2012) and 
Sharif et al. (2012) reported a negative relation of liquidity with financial leverage.  
 
The results are a negative influence on leverage liquidity are Deesomsak et al. (2004), 
Tong and Green (2005), Viviani (2008), Afza & Hussain, (2011), Guney et al. 
(2011), Mishra and Tannous (2010) and Sharif et al. (2012). While liquidity has a 
positive effect on research Leverage Yu (2000). Ozkan (2001) and Fama and French 
(2002). 
 
2.2.3 Size  
 
Leverage is expected to be positively influenced by size. The most plausible reason to 
explain such relationship is bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977; Marsh, 1982; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). That is: first, large firms have, on average, lower bankruptcy costs – 
this type of costs are in, general, more fixed – than small firms; second, large firms 
have in principle more diversified portfolios, with less probability of bankruptcy; 
third, financial institutions, because they have less information about a small firm, 
need to allocate more resources concerning the firm’s monitoring, and penalise it by 
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asking for higher interest rates. Although the vast majority of research shows a 
positive relationship between size and leverage, such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Shenoy and Koch (1996), there is also some research that reveals the opposite 
results, namely those obtained by Titman and Wessels (1988). The bankruptcy cost 
theory explains the positive relation between the capital structure and size of a firm. 
The large firms are more diversified, have easy access to the capital market, receive 
higher credit ratings for debt issues, and pay lower interest rate on debt capital. 
Further, larger firms are less prone to bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels 1988) and this 
implies the less probability of bankruptcy and lower bankruptcy costs. The 
bankruptcy cost theory suggests the lower bankruptcy costs, the higher debt level. 
 
Wald (1999), Fama and French (2002), Baral (2004), Deesomsak at al. (2004), 
Istaitieh and Rodríguez-Fernández (2006), Cheng and Shiu (2007), De Jong at al. 
(2008), Serrasqueiro and Rogão (2009), Lin et al. (2009), Céspedes et al. (2010), 
Gropp and Heider (2010), Khrawish and Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili dan Farouk (2011), 
Siringoringo (2012), Sanistyaningrum dan Gandakusuma (2012), Guney et al. (2011), 
Amjad et al. (2012) and Sharif et al. (2012) size shows a positive effect on leverage. 
While, Shah and Khan (2007) and Mishra and Tannous (2010) results size the 
negative effect on leverage.  
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
12 
 
The population consists of 26 community development banks. The study 14 regional 
development banks because of difficulty in getting the data. The period under study is 
from 1995 to 2010. The data are taken from banks’ annual reports. In this study using 
panel data and analysis using pooled ordinary least square (OLS) and random effect. 
while fixed effect is not used in the analysis because the number of banks has not 
changed to any bank during the study period and there were three dummy variables. 
To test capital structure of community development banks, the following model is 
estimated: 
 
LEVit = 0 + 1*DRAit + 2*DEQUITYit + 3*DCRISISit + ZT + eit  
 
where 
LEVit  : Leverage that total debt to total assets of bank i in period t,  
DRAit   :  A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one if t is from 2000 to 
2006, zero otherwise, 
DEQUITYit : A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one if bank i has 
equity in excess of 100 million rupiah in period t, zero otherwise. 
DCRISISit : A dummy crisis variable that takes on a value of one if t is from 1997 to 
1999, zero otherwise, 
Z : A matrix of control variables, which included net income to total assets (ROA), 
loans to assets (LOANS) and natural logarithm of total assets (ASSETS). 
eit : error term of bank i in period t.  
 
 
4. FINDING AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 
LEV DRA DEQUITY DCRISIS ROA LOANS ASSETS 
LEV 1.000 
 
      
DRA 0.163 1.000 
 
     
DEQUITY 0.124 0.800 1.000     
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DCRISIS -0.248 -0.712 -0.570 1.000 
 
   
ROA -0.085 -0.139 -0.106 0.204 1.000 
 
  
LOANS -0.819 -0.135 -0.039 0.164 0.055 1.000 
 
 
ASSETS 0.096 0.484 0.527 -0.349 -0.074 -0.007 1.000 
 
LEV is total debt to total assets; RA is A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one from 
2000 to 2006, zero otherwise; DEQUITY is A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one 
bank has equity in excess of 100 million rupiah, zero otherwise; DCRISIS is A dummy crisis variable 
that takes on a value of one if from 1997 to 1999, zero otherwise; ROA is net income to total assets; 
LOANS is loans to total assets and ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets 
Table 1 provides information on the degree of correlation between the explanatory 
variables used in the multivariate regression analysis. The matrix shows that in 
general the correlation between the variable that are used in the analysis is not strong 
suggesting that multicollinearity problem are either not severe or non-existent. 
Kennedy (2008) and Gujarati (2009) points out that multicollinearity is a problem 
when the correlation is above 0.8, which is not the case here. To ensure that there is 
no problem of multicollinearity, variance inflation factor (VIF) are estimated and 
since the results show that the VIF are below 10.  
 
Table 2 presents the pooled regression results without adjusting standard errors and 
with robust standard errors for heteroscedasticity. When we test for heteroscedasticity 
using Breusch-Pagan test, we find that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal 
variances. Thus, a better estimation model should account for heteroscedasticity 
Table 2 reports the results based on adjusted standard errors using heteroscedasticity-
adjusted standard error. We find that all coefficients are significant for LEV except 
ROA variable. The result regression with random effects show that DCRISIS and 
LOANS are significant on LEV (Table 3). 
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Table 2 
Regression Without Adjusting And With Robust Standard Errors 
Dependent Variable : LEV 
Variable OLS without standard errors OLS with robust standard errors                  
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
 
Constan 
 
1.0144 
 
0.000*** 
 
1.0144 
 
0.000*** 
DRA -.0537 0.017** -.0537 0.003*** 
DEQUITY .0327 0.079* .0327 0.006*** 
DCRISIS -.0539 0.006*** -.0539 0.016** 
ROA -.0098 0.633 -.0098 0.742 
LOANS -.2820 0.000*** -.2820 0.000*** 
ASSETS .0033 0.165 .0033 0.099* 
     
R-squared 0.6947  0.6947  
Adjusted R-squared 0.6863    
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0002  
Number observation 224  224  
LEV is total debt to total assets; RA is A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one from 
2000 to 2006, zero otherwise; DEQUITY is A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one 
bank has equity in excess of 100 million rupiah, zero otherwise; DCRISIS is A dummy crisis variable 
that takes on a value of one if from 1997 to 1999, zero otherwise; ROA is net income to total assets; 
LOANS is loans to total assets and ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Regression With Random Effects 
Dependent Variable : LEV 
 
Variable Coef. p-value 
 
Constan 
 
1.0099    
 
0.000***      
DRA   -.0341    0.108     
DEQUITY .0082     0.653     
DCRISIS -.0525    0.003***     
ROA -.0189    0.324     
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LOANS -.2823    0.000***     
ASSETS .0037    0.106     
   
R-squared 0.6919  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  
Number observation 224  
LEV is total debt to total assets; RA is A dummy regional autonomy that takes on a value of one from 
2000 to 2006, zero otherwise; DEQUITY is A dummy equity variable that takes on a value of one 
bank has equity in excess of 100 million rupiah, zero otherwise; DCRISIS is A dummy crisis variable 
that takes on a value of one if from 1997 to 1999, zero otherwise; ROA is net income to total assets; 
LOANS is loans to total assets and ASSETS is natural logarithm of total assets. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, p-value in parentheses 
 
DRA (regional autonomy) has a negative impact on LEV and the coefficient of 
5.37%. This suggests that regional autonomy with effect from the year 2000, Region 
development bank can lower the amount of debt may have received additional 
funding from the local government of the increase revenue and expenditure (budget) 
and kept in current accounts deposited with the local government or serve as 
additional equity the BPD. The funds from the local government can reduce BPD to 
increased hunting effort that comes from deposit funds so that the composition of 
debt can be reduced. In addition, funding of local governments can be used to be 
placed in Bank Indonesia Certificates (BIC) which at the beginning of the second 
quarter of 2007, total deposits of all positions in the region development bank placed 
around 96 trillion rupiah or 24, 35% of the total Bank Indonesia Certificates by all 
banks.  
 
 
DEQUITY has a positive impact on LEV and the coefficient of 3.27%. This suggests 
that the BPD has equity greater than 100 billion rupiah more to add to the amount of 
debt due to BPD can increase the amount debt by an increase in equity. This 
condition is to maintain the bank's financial risk in the amount of the debt to equity 
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ratio. In these circumstances the local government will assist BPD when adding 
equity if deposit funding has increased. BPD will be able to increase the amount of 
debt to be distributed on loan. 
DCRISIS has a negative impact on LEV and the coefficient of 5.39%. This indicates 
that financial crisis in Indonesia, BPD reduce the amount of debt due to deduct 
interest payments on debt are high and keep the bank from bankruptcy. This finding 
is consistent with Fosberg (2012) who find a negative relationship of crisis on 
leverage. 
 
The relationship between LEV and profitability (ROA), while a negative expected, is 
not statistically significant. This may be due to the advantage of BPD handed over to 
local government funding sources that are not used as an internal bank to reduce the 
amount of bank debt. The result is contrast with most previous such as Gropp and 
Heider (2010), Khrawish and Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili and Farouk (2011), Afza and 
Hussain (2011), Alves and Ferreira (2011), Siringoringo (2012), Sanistyaningrum and 
Gandakusuma (2012) and Sharif et al. (2012) there are a negative impact of ROA on 
leverage. 
 
The finding showed that LOANS negative impact on LEV and the coefficient of 
28.20%. This suggests that the level of loans has a significant influence on the ability 
of banks to provide funds. Loans is high as seen from the level of non-performing 
loans from a bank, it can reduce the level of public confidence, which led to banks 
having difficulty in raising funds from third parties, thus reducing the sources of debt 
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financing. Penelitian ini mendukung hasil penelitian Guney et al. (2011), Mishra and 
Tannous (2010) and Sharif et al. (2012) reported a negative relation of liquidity to 
financial leverage.  
 
The finding showed that ASSETS positive impact on LEV and the coefficient of 
0.33%. These results are consistent with the trade-off theory in which the ASSETS of 
large banks tend to use more debt in comparison small bank. Bank with large size 
bank indicates that the bank has a large asset such as this tend to use bank debt in the 
capital structure have greater access easier to obtain bank loans because these are 
considered to have a smaller risk of bankruptcy than small banks. The result is 
consistent with previous research study conducted by Wald (1999), Fama and French 
(2002), Baral (2004), Deesomsak at al. (2004), Istaitieh and Rodríguez-Fernández 
(2006), Cheng and Shiu (2007), De Jong at al. (2008), Serrasqueiro and Rogão 
(2009), Lin et al. (2009), Céspedes et al. (2010), Gropp and Heider (2010), Khrawish 
and Khraiwesh (2010), Ellili and Farouk (2011), Siringoringo (2012), 
Sanistyaningrum and Gandakusuma (2012), Guney et al. (2011), Sharif et al. (2012) 
showed ASSETS  positive impact on leverage. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we examine the determinants of capital structure of regional 
development banks in Indonesia. The period under study is from 1995 to 2010. Our 
study uncovers interesting results. We find that regional autonomy and economic 
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crisis have a negative impact on leverage and dummy equity has a positive impact on 
leverage. In addition our result showed that LOANS negative and ASSETS positive 
impact on leverage. while the ROA a negative expected, is not statistically 
significant. In future research to obtain better results expected in order to addition the 
variable and comparing with private and government banks. 
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